The Possible Models Approach (PMA) introduced by Winslett, proposes, among other things, a domain-independent criterion for measuring similarity between different states of a dynamic system. The concept of similarity between states (possible worlds) appears also in the area of Belief Revision in the form of a system of spheres. Systems of spheres are in turn connected to epistemic entrenchments by means of the AGM revision functions that the two structures induce. In view of these connections, in this article we study the implications of adopting PMA's criterion of similarity in the context of Belief Revision. More precisely, we formulate conditions that capture PMA's criterion of similarity in terms of systems of spheres (PMA systems of spheres) and we provide an axiomatic characterization of the class of epistemic entrenchments corresponding to systems of spheres that comply with PMA's criterion of similarity (PMA epistemic entrenchments). We also discuss some interesting properties of the class of PMA system of spheres and PMA epistemic entrenchments. Our study is primarily motivated by the role that PMA epistemic entrenchments can play in Reasoning about Action.
Introduction
Much of the research in Reasoning about Action is driven by the principle of minimal change, which loosely speaking says that as little as possible changes in the world during the occurrence of an event. Motivated by this principle, Winslett introduced in [13] a method for dealing with the frame problem known as the Possible Models Approach (PMA). Although vanilla PMA was shown to be inadequate as a general solution to the frame problem, it remains useful for a number of interesting domains and in many cases it has formed the basis for more sophisticated approaches. One of the most interesting features of the PMA is that it introduces a domain-independent criterion for measuring the similarity between two states of a dynamic system. More precisely, system states are represented as Herbrand models of some first-order language, and the similarity between two models Û and Ö is defined in terms of the ground literals that have different truth values in the two models. We shall refer to this criterion as PMA's criterion of similarity.
The concept of similarity between states (possible worlds) also appears in the area of Belief Revision, and it is formally captured by a structure called system of spheres [5] . Contrary to the PMA however, systems of spheres impose no constraints on how similarity between possible worlds is to be measured. Our aim in this article in to study the implications of adopting PMA's criterion of similarity in the context of Belief Revision. More precisely, we first formulate conditions that capture PMA's criterion of similarity in terms of systems of spheres. Then, using the connection between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments [4] (by means of the revision functions that the two structures induce), we identify and study the properties of the family of epistemic entrenchments corresponding to systems of spheres that comply with PMA's criterion of similarity. We call these epistemic entrenchments PMA epistemic entrenchments. It should be noted that, by its very nature, PMA's criterion of similarity applies most naturally to systems of spheres centred around a single world. For this reason our entire study focuses only on systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments related to consistent complete theories.
There are mainly two reasons that prompted us to study PMA's criterion of similarity in the context of Belief Revision. First, PMA's criterion of similarity is a natural way of measuring distance between possible worlds, although admittedly not applicable in every situation. This criterion essentially reflects an underlying assumption that the world is modelled in such a way that ground literals (as opposed to arbitrary formulas) correspond to the key concepts or the primitives of the domain under consideration.
The second main reason for this study relates to the idea of using epistemic entrenchment in Reasoning about Action as outlined in [10] and [7] . In this context an epistemic entrenchment can be seen as an encoding at the syntactic level, of a preferential ordering on models. This suggests that for a number of preferential entailment relations it should in principle be possible to duplicate their inferences syntactically, using an appropriately defined epistemic entrenchment. To this end, PMA epistemic entrenchments play a central role, since many of the preferential orderings on models that are used in reasoning about action, are based on set inclusion in a fashion similar to the PMA. This connection to Reasoning about Action will be further pursued in a forthcoming paper. In this article we shall study PMA epistemic entrenchments only in the context of Belief Revision.
This article is structured as follows. In the following section we introduce some notation. In Section 3 we briefly review the main definitions and results from Belief Revision. In Section 4 we present the Possible Models Approach in the context of Reasoning about Action as it was originally introduced. In Sections 5 and 6 we formulate conditions that capture PMA's criterion of similarity both in terms of systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments, defining respectively the classes of PMA systems of spheres and PMA epistemic entrenchments. The fact that PMA epistemic entrenchments are indeed the class of epistemic entrenchments corresponding to PMA systems of spheres is formally proved in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8 we make some concluding remarks on the implications of our results in the context of belief base revision as described by Rott in [11] .
Preliminaries
Throughout this article we shall be working with a propositional language Ä, governed by classical propositional logic that we identify with its consequence relation . We shall denote by È the (possibly infinite) set of all propositional letters of Ä. A literal of Ä is either a propositional letter or the negation of a propositional letter. We denote by the set of all literals of Ä, i.e. È Ô Ô ¾ È . We shall say that a sentence ³ ¾ Ä is contingent iff ³ and ³. 
The AGM paradigm
Belief revision is the process by which an agent changes her beliefs in the light of new information. Much of the research in the area is based on the work of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [1] who have proposed and investigated a set of postulates, widely known as the AGM postulate, which appear to capture much of what characterizes rational belief revision. In their framework, which we shall refer to as the AGM framework, belief states are represented as theories of Ä, and the process of belief revision is modelled as a special function * called a revision function. More precisely, a revision function £ is any function from Å Ä ¢ Ä to Å Ä , mapping Ì ³ to Ì £ ³, that satisfies the following postulates (refer to [3] for a detailed discussion on the motivation behind these postulates).
Apart from this axiomatic approach to belief revision, two explicit constructions for this process have been proposed. We briefly review them below.
Epistemic entrenchments
The first constructive model that we discuss has been proposed by Gardenfors and Makinson [4] and it is based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment. Formally, an epistemic entrenchment related to a theory Ì of Ä, is a binary relation in Ä that satisfies the following axioms [3] :
From the above postulates it follows that every epistemic entrenchment is a total preorder in
Ä.
Intuitively, an epistemic entrenchment related to a theory Ì represents the relative epistemic loss caused by the removal of a belief from Ì; that is, the higher a belief is in the epistemic entrenchment preorder , the more is lost in terms of epistemic value by its removal from Ì. Consequently, for any two formulas ³ and such that ³ , whenever a choice exists between giving up ³ and giving up the former will be surrendered in order to minimize the epistemic loss. Formally the idea of an epistemic entrenchment determining the result of belief revision is captured by the following condition:
Gardenfors and Makinson [4] proved that the family of functions over theories constructed from epistemic entrenchments by means of (E*) is precisely the class of revision functions (i.e. the functions satisfying the postulates (Ã £ ½) -(Ã £ )). 2 
Systems of spheres
In [5] , Grove introduced another construction of a revision function that instead of a preorder on sentences, is based on a special structure on consistent complete theories, called a system of spheres.
Let § be a subset of Å Ä (i.e. § is a set of consistent complete theories). A system of spheres Ë centred on §, is a collection of subsets of Å Ä , the elements of which are called spheres, that satisfies the following conditions:
(S1) Ë is totally ordered with respect to set inclusion; that is, if Í Î¾ Ë then Í Î or Î Í.
(S2) The smallest sphere in Ë is §; that is § ¾ Ë, and if Î ¾ Ë then § Î .
(S3) Å Ä ¾ Ë (and therefore Å Ä is the largest sphere in Ë).
(S4) For every ³ ¾ Ä, if there is any sphere in Ë intersecting ³ then there is also a smallest sphere in Ë intersecting ³ . For a system of spheres Ë and a consistent formula ³ ¾ Ä, the smallest sphere in Ë intersecting ³ is denoted Ë´³ µ. When ³ is inconsistent, Ë´³ µ is taken to be Å Ä . With any system of spheres Ë, Grove associates a function Ë Ä ¾ Å Ä defined as follows, Ë´³ µ ³ Ë´³ µ ÓÖ Ú ÖÝ ³ ¾ Ä Consider now a theory Ì of Ä and let Ë be a system of spheres centred on Ì . Grove uses Ë to define constructively the process of revising Ì, by means of the following condition.
Grove showed that the class of functions generated from systems of spheres by means of (Ë£), is precisely the family of revision functions (i.e. the functions satisfying the AGM postulates).
Let us briefly consider the intuition behind a system of spheres as a basis for constructing revision functions. Let Ì be a consistent theory of Ä taken as a belief state. A consistent complete theory of Ä is treated as a possible world, and a system of spheres Ë centred on Ì is regarded as an ordering on possible worlds with respect to their plausibility, given Ì as the current belief state. The closer a possible world is to the centre of Ë, the more plausible it is. With this reading of a system of spheres, condition (Ë£) defines the revision of Ì by ³ to be the theory determined by the most plausible worlds satisfying ³. In this context we shall often refer to a consistent complete theory as a possible world, or simply a world.
Given the connection between systems of spheres and revision functions, which in turn are connected to epistemic entrenchments, it should in principle be possible to establish a direct connection between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments. Indeed this connection is expressed by the following condition.
(SE) For any two contingent ³ ¾ Ä , ³ iff Ë´ ³µ Ë´ µ.
The following result follows almost immediately from the representation results connecting revision functions to systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments. Let Ì be a theory of Ä, an epistemic entrenchment related to Ì, and Ë a system of spheres centred on Ì . Then and Ë correspond to the same revision function by means of ( £) and (Ë£) respectively iff they satisfy condition (SE).
The possible models approach
Consider a robot, call it Tyro (to use the same name used by Winslett in [13] ), that has certain information about the current state of a dynamic system, formally represented as a theory Ì of Ä. One of the central problems in Reasoning about Action is to design a formal method that will enable Tyro, based on Ì, to derive information about the state of the system resulting from the occurrence of an event at the current state. Moreover it is expected that this formal method would capitalize on general properties of 'commonsense domains' so that the intended conclusions can be derived from minimal background information on the dynamics of the system (ideally, one would be able to derive the intended inferences based on the postcondition of the occurring event alone). Motivated by the principle of minimal change, Winslett proposed in [13] a method called the Possible Models Approach (PMA), that to some extent addresses the above problem. The essential idea of the PMA is the following.
For each system state Û compatible with Tyro's beliefs Ì, one selects the nearest states to Û that satisfy the postcondition of the occurring event . The system states so selected determine a new theory Ì ¼ (defined as the set of sentences that hold in all those states) which is taken to represent Tyro's beliefs about the effects of the occurring event .
The above method of course presupposes some means of measuring distance or similarity between system states. Winslett represents system states as Herbrand models of some firstorder language. For the sake of notational simplicity (in view of the forthcoming connection with Belief Revision), we shall deviate slightly from Winslett's original proposal and model system states as consistent complete theories of our propositional language Ä. With this convention, Winslett's measure of similarity can be described as follows.
For a state Û (alias consistent complete theory) define ¡´Ûµ to be the set of all propositional letters in Û, i.e. ¡´Ûµ Û È . For two states Û and Ö, define «´Û Öµ to be the symmetric difference of ¡´Ûµ and ¡´Öµ, i.e. «´Û Öµ ´¡´Ûµ ¡´Öµµ ´¡´Öµ ¡´Ûµµ.
Then for a given state Û, a state Ö is said to be closer or more similar to Û than the state Ö ¼ , if
We shall refer to this criterion as PMA's criterion of similarity.
It should be noted that in [6] , Katsuno and Mendelzon generalized Winslett's method of modelling the process by which a rational agent changes his beliefs in response to changes in the world. More precisely, Katsuno and Mendelzon introduced a new operator ¥ over theories, called the update operator, which maps the agent's beliefs Ì about the current state of the world, and the postcondition ³ of the occurring event, to a new theory Ì¥³ representing the agent's beliefs about the new state of the world. The update operator ¥ was defined axiomatically as well as constructively, and it was shown to be different from the AGM revision functions (i.e. it does not necessarily satisfy the postulates (K*1) -(K*8)). Despite their differences however, a connection between the two types of belief change can in fact be established. More precisely it can be shown, [9] , that, under certain conditions, update operators ¥ are connected to revision functions £, by means of the following identity:
It is precisely this connection between revision and update that makes possible the use of epistemic entrenchment in Reasoning about Action [10] .
PMA systems of spheres
Let us now resume our discussion on Grove's constructive model for belief revision. As mentioned earlier, a system of spheres is to be interpreted as a plausibility ordering on possible worlds. Yet the conditions (Ë½) -(Ë ) impose no constraints as to what an appropriate measure of plausibility might be. Suppose that we identify plausibility with similarity which in turn we measure in the spirit of the PMA; what would the resulting systems of spheres look like?
First we note that PMA's criterion of similarity allows one to measure (relative) similarity in reference to a single world (representing the initial state) as opposed to a set of worlds. We will therefore confine ourselves to systems of spheres centred on singletons. Consider therefore a system of spheres Ë centred on a world Û . According to PMA's criterion of similarity, for any possible world Ö, the smaller «´Û Öµ is, the closer Ö is to the centre of the system. This can be formally expressed by the following condition:
(SP) For any two consistent complete theories Ö and Ö
We shall call a system of spheres Ë that satisfies (SP), a PMA system of spheres. We note that in the original version of the PMA, the criterion of similarity employed was in fact stronger than that expressed by (SP). In particular, for any two worlds Ö and Ö ¼ , Ö was more similar to a third world Û if Ò ÓÒÐÝ «´Û Öµ «´Û Ö ¼ µ. However this stronger version of (SP) cannot be adopted in the present context since it gives rise to partial preorders on worlds, whereas the preorders induced by systems of spheres are always total; in other words, this stronger version of (SP) is inconsistent with the definition of a system of spheres.
PMA epistemic entrenchments
Let us now consider the class of epistemic entrenchments corresponding to PMA systems of spheres. To formulate the epistemic entrenchment counterpart of (SP) we first need to introduce some notation.
Let Û be a consistent complete theory of Ä, and ³ a sentence in Ä. A support set for ³ in Û is a set of literals in Û that entails ³, i.e. Û and ³. A support set for ³ in Û is minimal iff no proper subset of it entails ³. The intuitive reading of the above and the following definitions is based on the view that the literals in Û are the primary or explicit beliefs, and all other sentences in Û follow from them. Thus for example, intuitively, a minimal support set for ³ in Û is a minimal set of premisses that suffices to 'justify' the presence of ³ in Û. In this sense we define a cut for ³ in Û to be a minimal set of literals whose withdrawal from Û will leave ³ unsupported. Formally, a cut for ³ in Û is a set of literals in Û, Û , such that´Û µ ³, and for every proper subset
We shall say that a sentence is better supported than a sentence ³ in Û, which we denote by ³» , iff ¾ Û and moreover, for every cut for in Û, there is a cut
¼ is a proper subset of . Intuitively, is better supported than ³ in Û, if there are more 'links' (deductions) connecting to the premisses (literals), than there are for ³. Therefore, whenever ones cuts enough links to 'disconnect' from the premises, regardless of how this is done (there are in general more than one ways), ³ also gets disconnected.
With the above definitions, we can now formulate the counterpart of (SP) for epistemic entrenchments. Consider an epistemic entrenchment related to a consistent complete theory Û. The condition (EP) below turns out to be the epistemic entrenchment duplicate of (SP):
Condition (EP) associates the epistemic entrenchment of a sentence, with the degree of support it has in a theory; the more supported a sentence is, the higher the sentence appears in the epistemic entrenchment ordering. We shall call an epistemic entrenchment that satisfies (EP) a PMA epistemic entrenchment. As the name suggests, PMA epistemic entrenchments are intended to correspond (by means of (SE)), to PMA systems of spheres. The results of the next section prove that this is indeed the case.
A word on terminology before proceeding with the technical results. We have seen that, in the context of Belief Revision, an epistemic entrenchment is to be taken as representing the relative epistemic loss generated by the removal of various beliefs from a belief state Ì. With this reading of , the qualification 'epistemic' in its name is well justified. When it comes to a PMA epistemic entrenchment however, one needs to be a bit more careful with the use of the term 'epistemic'. The scepticism arises not from technical considerations (clearly the preorder fully deserves the name 'epistemic entrenchment' since it satisfies the postulates (EE1)-(EE5) in addition to (EP)), but rather from the possibility of using in a context other than that of Belief Revision. More precisely, according to the representation results of the following section, a PMA epistemic entrenchment can be regarded as the syntactic encoding of a preorder on possible worlds that complies with PMA's criterion of similarity. This is precisely the reading adopted for when it is used in Reasoning about Action [10] . In this context however, the qualification 'epistemic' for is misleading, since the preorder on possible worlds that encodes, relates to ontological features of the world, rather than epistemological properties of a rational agent. Nevertheless, since in this article we focus only on the technical properties of in the context of Belief Revision, we shall continue to use the name 'PMA epistemic entrenchment', and leave any terminological considerations to a forthcoming paper that discusses extensively the use of PMA epistemic entrenchments in Reasoning about Action.
Representation results
Before we can establish the alleged connection between PMA systems of spheres and PMA epistemic entrenchments, we need to introduce some more notation.
For a literal Ô of Ä, by Ô we represent the literal that is logically equivalent to Ô. 4 For a theory Ì, we define ´Ìµ to be the set of all literals in Ì, i.e. ´Ìµ Ì . For a consistent complete theory Ö and a set of literals , we define ´Ö µ to be the set ´Ö µ ´ ´Öµ µ Ô Ô ¾ Ö . Intuitively ´Ö µ is produced by taking all literals in Ö and negating the ones in (while preserving the rest). Notice that for any Ö and , the logical closure of ´Ö µ is always a consistent complete theory.
Consider now a consistent complete theory Û and a system of spheres Ë centred on Û .
The condition (SPE) below will be used extensively in our proofs as an intermediate between (SP) and (EP).
(SPE) For any consistent sentence ³ ¾ Ä and for every Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ, there exists a cut for ³ in Û such that ´Öµ ´Û µ.
Intuitively, (SPE) can be interpreted as the constructive counterpart of (SP). Indeed, suppose that we want to revise the consistent complete theory Û with the sentence ³. We shall focus on the principle case where ³ ¾ Û. According to the system of spheres model, the resulting theory is defined in terms the set Ë´³ µ of the most similar ³-worlds. Moreover, PMA's criterion of similarity, or more precisely (SP), dictates that any such world Ö isminimal in terms of «´Û Öµ. Let us consider how such a world Ö can be constructed from Û. There are three requirements that this construction must satisfy: first, Ö must be a consistent complete theory. Second, Ö must contain ³ (and therefore we must give up ³ in order to maintain consistency). Third, we must preserve as many of the literals in Û as possible. Condition (SPE) suggests that this can be done as follows. We first pick a cut for ³ in Û.
Then out of all the literals in Û, we give up only the ones in and accept their negation, thus producing the set ´Û µ. Finally, we close ´Û µ under logical implication. It is not hard to see that this construction satisfies all three of the above requirements. Indeed, as already discussed Ò ´Û µµ is a consistent complete theory, so the first requirement is satisfied.
For the third requirement notice that, although we want to minimize change in literals, we also want to give up ³ and therefore we need to give up at least one element of every support set for ³ in Û. Therefore we cannot do any better than giving up all the members of (which by definition is a -minimal set of literals intersecting all support sets of ³ in Û).
Consequently by giving up only the members of , we satisfy the third requirement. For the second requirement one needs to show that ´Û µ ³, which is not hard to prove, given that is a cut for ³ in Û.
We note that although the above argument appears to suggest that (SP) and (SPE) are equivalent, this in fact is not the case (unless the underlying language is a finitary propositional one). Condition (SP) is slightly stronger than (SPE) (this will become evident from the results that follow).
Let us now proceed with the first technical result of this paper. Theorem 7.1 below tells us that the epistemic entrenchment corresponding to a PMA systems of spheres is a PMA epistemic entrenchment. ¼ . Note that is finite. Indeed, it is not hard to verify that the propositional letters that appear in any minimal support set for ³ in Û, also appear in ³. Given that there are only finitely many propositional letters in ³ it follows that there are only finitely many distinct minimal support sets for ³ in Û. Consequently, every cut for ³ in Û is also finite. Let us denote by the disjunction of the literals in , and let Ö be the consistent complete theory Ö Ò ´Û µµ. By the construction of and Ö it follows that ³ ¾ Ö, ¾ Ö, ¾ Ö ¼ , and is the only cut for in Û. From (SPE) we then derive that Ë´ µ Ö . Combining the above we derive that there exists a sphere of Ë (namely Ë´ µ) that contains Ö but not Ö ¼ , as desired.
An interesting repercussion of the implication (SP) µ (SPE) in Theorem 7.1 is that for any PMA system of spheres Ë centred on a world Û and any sentence ³, Ë´³ µ is always finite. Indeed, since for any world Û and sentence ³ there are only finitely many minimal support sets for ³ in Û (see the proof of (SPE) µ (EP) above), there are also only finitely many cuts for ³ in Û, and therefore (SPE) implies that there are only finitely many worlds in Ë´³ µ. In fact we note that, not only is Ë´³ µ finite, but it is also elementary [2] , i.e. Ë´³ µ Ë´³ µ . This follows from a result reported in [8] , according to which a set Í of consistent complete theories is elementary iff for every Ö ¾ Í there is a ¾ Ä such that Ö Ò Í µ. To see that this latter condition holds for Ë´³ µ notice that, because of (SPE) (and what was mentioned above), each element Ö of Ë´³ µ differs from Û at most in the propositional letters that appear in ³. Consequently, for each Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ , there are only finitely many literals in ´Öµ ´ Ë´³ µµ, and therefore there is a ¾ Ä (namely the conjunction of all literals in ´Öµ ´ Ë´³ µµ) such that Ö Ò Ë´³ µ µ.
To complete our argument on the correspondence between PMA epistemic entrenchments and PMA systems of spheres we also need to prove the converse of Theorem 7.1. This turns out to be a non-trivial task. What complicates things is that in general the mapping between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchments expressed by (SE) is not one-toone (unless the underlying language is a finitary propositional one). More precisely, while there is always a unique epistemic entrenchment corresponding to a given system of spheres, there are in general more than one systems of spheres corresponding to a single epistemic entrenchment. Due to this asymmetry there are two different versions for the converse of Theorem 7.1. According to the first version, for any PMA epistemic entrenchment , all systems of spheres corresponding to satisfy (SP). It turns out, however, that this is not the case; there exist PMA epistemic entrenchments for which some associated system of spheres violates (SP). The second version of the converse of Theorem 7.1 is weaker. It states that for any PMA epistemic entrenchment , there is at least one system of spheres corresponding to (by means of (SE)), that satisfies (SP). Our aim for the remainder of this section is to prove this weak converse of Theorem 7.1. As a first step to this end consider the following result.
LEMMA 7.2
Let Û be a consistent complete theory, Ë a system of spheres centred on Û , and the epistemic entrenchment corresponding to Ë by means of (SE). If satisfies (EP) then Ë satisfies (SPE).
PROOF. Assume that satisfies (EP)
. Let ³ be a consistent sentence of Ä, and Ö an arbitrary element of Ë´³ µ. If ³ ¾ Û then (SPE) is trivially satisfied. Assume therefore that ³ ¾ Û and consequently ³ ¾ Û. Define to be the set ´Ûµ ´Öµ. Clearly ´Öµ ´Û µ, and therefore in order for Ö to satisfy (SPE), must be a cut for ³ in Û. Assume on the contrary that is not a cut for ³ in Û. Based on this assumption we shall construct two sentence such that,
» .
(ii)
³.
Having constructed such we can derive a contradiction as follows. From (i), (EP) and (SE) it follows that Ë´ µ Ë´ µ. Moreover from (ii) we derive that Ë´³ µ Ë´ µ and therefore Ë´³ µ Ë´ µ. On the other hand however, from (iii) and Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ it follows that Ë´ µ Ë´³ µ, which of course lead us to a contradiction.
Let us now proceed with the construction of and . Since ³ ¾ Ö and ³ ¾ Û, it follows that intersects every support set for ³ in Û. Notice that the entailment of (SPE) from (EP) in Lemma 7.2 is of the 'strong type', i.e. for any PMA epistemic entrenchment , all systems of spheres (as opposed to 'at least one' system of sphere) associated with by means of (SE), satisfy (SPE). Therefore, if we were able to establish the equivalence between (SPE) and (SP) we would have had a proof for the strong converse of Theorem 7.1 discussed earlier. Yet, as mentioned above, this is not possible. Although (SP) entails (SPE) (see proof of Theorem 7.1), the converse is not in general true. We shall therefore follow a different line of inquiry which eventually will lead us to a proof of the weak converse of Theorem 7.1. We start by taking a closer look at systems of spheres and defining, among other things, the notion of a reachable world.
Let Ë be a system of spheres, and Ö a consistent complete theory of Ä. We shall say that Ö is reachable in Ë iff there exists a sentence ³ of Ä such that Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ [7] . If Ö is not reachable in Ë we shall say that Ö is unreachable in Ë. When Ë is defined over a finitary propositional language it is not hard to verify that every consistent complete theory is reachable in Ë. However, if the underlying language has infinitely many propositional letters, one can show that there exist systems of spheres containing unreachable worlds. Assume that Ë is such a system of spheres, and let Ì be the smallest spheres in Ë, where Ì is a theory of Ä. Moreover let Ö be a world that is unreachable in Ë. By definition, there is no sentence ³ for which Ö contributes to defining the revision of Ì by ³ (in the sense of Ö being an element of Ë´³ µ) and therefore as far as the belief revision process is concerned, Ö is in a way 'redundant'. In fact, if Ö is not already outside every sphere of Ë other than Å Ä , we can move Ö further away from the centre of Ë (making it in a sense even more unreachable) without changing the revision policy determined by Ë. Let us make these ideas more precise by introducing some formal definitions.
Let Ì be a theory of Ä and Ë, Ë ¼ two systems of spheres both centred on Ì . We shall say that Ë and Ë ¼ are revision equivalent [7] iff for all ³ ¾ Ä , Ë´³ µ Ë ¼´³µ. Clearly any two revision equivalent systems of spheres define the same revision function by means of (Ë£). Moreover it is not hard to see that for any two systems of spheres Ë and Ë ¼ , Ë and Ë ¼ map to the same epistemic entrenchment (by means of (SE)) iff they are revision equivalent. Our next definition is that of an irredundant system of spheres.We shall say that a system of spheres Ë is irredundant iff either all worlds are reachable in Ë, or the following condition holds: a world is unreachable in Ë iff it belongs to no sphere of Ë other than Å Ä . Notice that according to the above definition, if Ë contains unreachable worlds, then there are two requirements it has to satisfy in order to be irredundant; first, all unreachable worlds must dwell in the most remote region of Ë, and secondly, all reachable worlds must be strictly closer to the centre than any unreachable world.
Let us now formalize the idea discussed earlier of taking an arbitrary system of spheres Ë and moving an unreachable world further away from the centre without changing the induced revision policy. In fact we shall stretch this idea a bit further and describe a process of moving all unreachable worlds in Ë as far away from the centre as possible, thus producing an irredundant counterpart of Ë.
For a system of spheres Ë and a sphere Í ¾ Ë, we define Ë´Í µ to be the set of all worlds in Í that are reachable in Ë, i.e. Ë´Í µ Ö ¾ Í for some ³ ¾ Ä, Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ . We define the -remainder of Ë, which we denote by ´Ëµ, to be the set ´Ëµ Ë´Í µ Í ¾ Ë Å Ä . We call this process of reducing a system of spheres Ë to its -remainder,
-reduction [7] . Lemma 7.3 below (reported in [7] ) shows that, -reduction does precisely what we informally described above, namely it takes an arbitrary system of spheres and produces its irredundant, revision equivalent counterpart.
LEMMA 7.3
For any system of spheres Ë, ´Ëµ is an irredundant system of spheres that is revision equivalent to Ë.
Let us now take a step back and see how all these concepts associated with irredundant systems of spheres, are related to our current goal, which is to prove the weak converse of Theorem 7.1. Let be a PMA epistemic entrenchment associated with a consistent complete theory Û. Given Lemma 7.3, it is not hard to verify that there exists an irredundant system of spheres Ë related to by means of (SE). Moreover, from Lemma 7.2 it follows that every system of spheres related to by means of (SE), including of course Ë, satisfies (SPE). Although Ë may not necessarily satisfy (SP), in what follows we will show that it can be 'reshaped' into a revision equivalent system of spheres Ë that does satisfy (SP). This essentially sketches our proof for the weak converse of Theorem 7.1. We note that in this 'reshaping' the fact that Ë is irredundant is crucial (which is the main reason for reviewing this concept herein). An equally important property of Ë, and indeed of any other system of spheres that is revision equivalent to Ë, is that PMA's criterion of similarity holds at least for the reachable region of the system. More precisely, consider the condition (SP) ¼ below. 
Condition (SP)
¼ is essentially the restriction of (SP) to the reachable fragment of a system of spheres. Lemma 7.4 
below shows that (SP)
¼ is entailed by (SPE). We need one more supplementary result before we can proceed with the proof of the weak converse of Theorem 7.1.
LEMMA 7.5
Let Û be a consistent complete theory and Ë a system of spheres centered on Û that satisfies (SPE). Then a consistent complete theory Ö is reachable in Ë iff «´Û Öµ is finite.
PROOF.
ÄÀË µ ÊÀË
Let Ö be a consistent complete theory that is reachable in Ë, and let ³ be a consistent sentence of Ä such that Ö ¾ Ë´³ µ. If ³ ¾ Û then Ö Û and «´Û Öµ Ø. Assume therefore that ³ ¾ Û and consequently ³ ¾ Û. Define to be the set ´Ûµ ´Öµ. Clearly then ´Öµ ´Û µ and therefore by (SPE) we derive that is a cut for ³ in Û. The next thing to observe is that is finite. Indeed, it is not hard to verify that for any minimal support set for ³ in Û, the propositional letters that appear in also appear in ³ (i.e. the alphabet of is a subset of the alphabet of ³), and given that ³ contains only finitely many propositional letters, it follows that there are only finitely many distinct minimal support sets for ³ in Û (each one of which is of course finite by compactness). Then since is a cut for ³ in Û, it is a subset of the union of all minimal support sets for ³ in Û, and consequently is also finite. The final observation is that «´Û Öµ is the set of all propositional letters that appear in , and given that is finite, it follows that «´Û Öµ is also finite.
ÊÀË µ ÄÀË
Let Ö be a consistent complete theory such that «´Û Öµ is finite. If «´Û Öµ Ø then Ö Û and clearly then Ö is reachable in Ë. Assume therefore that «´Û Öµ Ø and define to be the set ´Ûµ ´Öµ Ø. Clearly ´Öµ ´Û µ and moreover since «´Û Öµ is finite it is not hard to see that is also finite. Let Ð ½ Ð ¾ Ð Ò be the elements of , i.e. Ð ½ Ð ¾ Ð Ò . We define ³ to be the sentence Ð ½ Ð ¾ ¡ ¡ ¡ Ð Ò . It is not hard to see that the only minimal support sets for ³ in Û are, Ð ½ , Ð ¾ , Ð ¿ , , Ð Ñ , and therefore the only cut for ³ in Û is . Consequently by (SPE), all members Ö ¼ of Ë´ ³µ must be such that
It is not hard to see that Ö is the only world that satisfies this requirement and therefore, given that Ë´ ³µ Ø (since ³ is consistent) we derive that Ö ¾ Ë´ ³µ, which again entails that Ö is reachable in Ë.
Apart from its contribution to the proof of Theorem 7.6 below, Lemma 7.5 is of interest in its own right since it reveals an interesting repercussion of PMA's criterion of similarity.
According to this lemma, when a system of spheres Ë centred on a world Û, satisfies (SPE), the revision of Û by any sentence ³, takes us to worlds that differ from Û only in finitely many propositional letters. To put it more pictorially, assume that when moving from Û to any other world Ö, we do so by progressively changing the truth values of the propositional letters in Û, one at a time, until we match the truth values that hold at Ö. Then Lemma 7.5 tells us that if a world is reachable at all, then it is reachable in a finite number of steps.
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of the weak converse of Theorem 7.1. THEOREM 7.6
Let Û be a consistent complete theory and an epistemic entrenchment related to Û, that satisfies (EP). Then there exists a system of spheres Ë associated with by means of (SE), that satisfies (SP).
PROOF. From Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3 it follows that there exists an irredundant system of spheres Ë centred on Û , that is related to by means of (SE), and satisfies (SPE). If all consistent complete theories are reachable in Ë then from Lemma 7.4 it follows that Ë satisfies (SP). Assume therefore that some worlds are unreachable in Ë. We will show how to construct from Ë a system of spheres Ë , which is revision equivalent to Ë and satisfies (SP).
Notice that because of Lemma 7.4, Ë satisfies (SP) ¼ , which as mentioned earlier is essentially the restriction of (SP) to the reachable fragment of Ë. Consequently the only worlds that could possibly violate (SP) are the unreachable ones which, since Ë is irredundant, are all equidistant from the centre of Ë and in fact they dwell at the most remote regions of the system. Therefore all we need to do to satisfy (SP) is essentially to 'spread out' the unreachable worlds in more than one spheres, in a way that complies with PMA's criterion of similarity. More precisely, we shall keep the reachable fragment of Ë intact, and we shall add some more spheres between this reachable fragment and Å Ä (essentially ordering the unreachable worlds) in a way that will bring about (SP) among unreachable worlds. The formal description of this construction is given below.
Let Î be the set of all unreachable worlds in Ë, which, given that Ë is irredundant, is essentially the set of all worlds outside every sphere of Ë other than Å Ä , i.e. Î Ö ¾ Å Ä for all Í ¾ Ë, if Í Å Ä then Ö ¾ Í . We shall denote the complement of Î , i.e. the set of all reachable worlds in Ë by É, i.e. É Å Ä Î . Let be a total preorder over By the construction of Ë it is not hard to verify that it is a system of spheres with the same centre as Ë. Moreover, the reachable fragment of both systems is the same which entails that Ë and Ë are revision equivalent. Therefore all that it is left to show is that Ë satisfies (SP). From the construction of Ë it follows immediately that the restriction of (SP) to the reachable fragment of Ë is satisfied, and so is the restriction of (SP) to the unreachable fragment of Ë . From this it might be tempting to conclude that (SP) holds for Ë as a whole. Yet we need to be a bit more cautious in taking this last step. While (SP) holds separately for the reachable and unreachable fragments of Ë , it might be violated by a pair of a reachable and an unreachable world. With the aid of Lemma 7.5 we show that this could never be the case. Theorem 7.6 is the weak converse of Theorem 7.1, and together they provide an axiomatic characterization of the class of epistemic entrenchments corresponding to systems of spheres that comply with PMA's criterion of similarity.
In view of the discussion on reachable worlds, it should be clear that the strong converse of Theorem 7.1 is not in general true. In fact one can be more precise and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the strong converse of Theorem 7.1: it holds iff the propositional language Ä has finitely many propositional letters. Indeed, if Ä has finitely many propositional letters, then there is a one-to-one correspondence between epistemic entrenchments and systems of spheres and consequently the weak and strong converse of Theorem 7.1 are equivalent. On the other hand, let us assume that Ä has infinitely many propositional letters and let Ë be an irredundant system of spheres centred on a world Û , that corresponds (by means of (SE)) to a PMA epistemic entrenchment . Combining Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.5 we derive that there are many (in fact infinitely many) unreachable worlds in Ë. More precisely, any world that differs from Û on infinitely many propositional letters is unreachable in Ë. It is not hard to see that among these unreachable worlds there are pairs 
Conclusion
The main result reported in this article is an axiomatic characterization of the class of PMA epistemic entrenchments (Theorems 7.1, 7.6). In the process of proving this result, a number of interesting properties about the structure of PMA system of spheres were revealed and briefly discussed. As mentioned in the introduction, what makes the exercise we undertook in this article worthwhile, is that PMA's criterion of similarity is a natural way of measuring distance between worlds which is particularly popular in Reasoning about Action. Therefore, identifying and studying the properties of the class of PMA epistemic entrenchments becomes significant, especially in view of the research programme outlined in [10] that shows how epistemic entrenchment can be used as an aid to deal with the frame problem (this line of inquiry will be pursued further in a separate publication).
We will conclude this article with a brief discussion on the relationship between PMA epistemic entrenchments and belief base revision as described by Rott in [11] .
In this context, a distinction is made between the explicit and the implicit beliefs of an agent, with the set À of explicit beliefs constituting what is called the belief base, and the logical closure Ì ÒÀµ of the belief base defining the belief set of the agent. The implication here is that implicit beliefs have a secondary status (they are derived from the explicit ones), and that it is essentially the belief base À that determines the revision policy. This may suggest that revision functions act on the base À (rather than the belief set Ì), mapping À and an arbitrary sentence ³ to a new belief base À £ ³. However in this paper we will adopt a slightly different approach to belief base revision. In particular, following
Rott [11] we will assume that '... what is changed is the theory Ì ÒÀµ generated by a base À. But how the theory is changed depends on the way it is axiomatized, on the structure of À'. According to this reading, the base À essentially plays a role analogous to an epistemic entrenchment in the sense that it is used to determine the particular revision policy that should apply to the belief set Ì ÒÀµ. Indeed, Rott provides a method of constructing a revision function * from a base À, 6 but perhaps more importantly, he also provides a method of generating an epistemic entrenchment from À that induces the same revision function *. In particular, the epistemic entrenchment generated from a base À is given by condition (BEE) below [11] To make a connection between our results and this construction we will focus on belief bases À that are made up entirely of literals, i.e. any member ³ of À is a propositional letter or the negation of a propositional letter. We shall call such a base À an atomic base. Consider now the converse of (EP), which we denote´ Èµ: Èµ For any two contingent sentences ³ ¾ Ä , if ³ then is better supported than ³ in ÒÀµ (i.e. ³» ).
Taken together, (EP) and´ Èµ clearly generate a unique relation from an atomic base À, which, interestingly enough, turns out to be precisely the same relation generated by (BEE) (when restricted to contingent sentences). At first glance this appears to suggest that the theorems reported in this article can be used to provide possible world semantics for belief base revision (at least for atomic bases). In particular, since (BEE) is strictly stronger than (EP), Theorem 7.6 appears to entail that PMA systems of spheres can be used as a constructive model for (atomic) base revision. There is however a flaw in this argument. As noted in [11] , the relation generated by (BEE) is an epistemic entrenchment in the generalized sense of Rott [12] , but not in the standard sense of Gardenfors and Makinson [4] . Consequently Theorem 7.6 no longer applies. One may consider reproducing the results of this article for generalized epistemic entrenchments in the sense of [12] . We conjecture that such a result will reveal a very close connection between (atomic) base revision (in the spirit of Rott [11] ) and PMA updates.
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